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A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making
by ROBIN FELDMAN*
In recent years, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a number
of cases concerning patentable subject matter. An area that can be
both breathtakingly broad and minutely particular, patentable subject
matter asks us to consider which innovations are of the type that we
might entertain the question of whether they should be granted
patent protection. Do we include living creatures, for example? How
about the components of life, such as genes and antibodies? Are
mathematical algorithms, computer models, and computer software
included? And just what is an algorithm anyway? These are the
types of questions that the Court must delve into when it grapples
with patentable subject matter.
There are many interesting elements of the Supreme Court's
modern jurisprudence on patentable subject matter, but one of the
most fascinating aspects is the conversation that emerges across time
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. It is a
conversation not just about the nature of patents, but also about the
nature of judicial decision-making. It implicates how one goes about
crafting the rules within an area of law, what approaches are tenable,
and what is the appropriate relationship among the various courts.
The conversation has the feel of an exchange between a teacher
and a student, or perhaps between an adult and an adolescent,
because after all, the Federal Circuit has been around only a few
short decades.' As with any conversation of this kind, much of the
talking is done by the one who has the wisdom conferred by virtue of
* Professor of Law & Director of the LAB Project, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164. The Act
"established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), effective
October 1, 1982, and transferred to this Court the jurisdiction previously vested in the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to review Patent and Trademark Office decisions."
Court Review of Patent and Trademark Office Decisions, 47 Fed. Reg. 47380-01.
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superior status, but there are occasional replies and rejoinders from
below.
We are nowhere near the end of the conversation. Rather, I
suspect that the 2010 Bilski2 decision and the Mayo v. Prometheus
decision in the spring of 2012 are the first two of what will someday
be called a quartet of Supreme Court cases on patentable subject
matter. The third is likely to be the Myriad gene patenting case,4 after
the Federal Circuit has decided it, yet again, on remand, or another
case involving patenting of genes. The fourth will be some yet to be
chosen case on patentability of computer software.
What is the reason for this extended conversation? The Federal
Circuit, in its carefree, adolescent life, has developed a habit of
resting on rules of convenience. The cases make distinctions to try to
reach a particular result, but the rules (and the distinctions within
those rules) lack general applicability and defensible logic. The
approach feels comfortable because of the end result, but it is
intellectually and operationally unsatisfying. Worse yet, the cases all
too often produce what I would call death by tinkering-change a
little piece here and a little piece there until the entire area threatens
to collapse of its own weight.
This is a problem in many areas of Federal Circuit jurisprudence,
but it is particularly evident in patentable subject matter. And it is
there, in the broad thematic spaces of patentable subject matter, that
the Supreme Court has engaged in its most detailed conversation yet
with the Federal Circuit.
There are those who may argue that judicial decision-making can
never be anything but the post-hoc justification of results to which
judges are inclined based on their backgrounds and perspectives! I
2. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. ., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012).
4. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This
case is commonly called the "Myriad" case, in reference to the name of the company
holding the patents at issue.
5. See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 274 (1929); JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Charles G. Haines, General Observations on the
Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL
L. REV. 96 (1922); Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966); Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998); cf. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377
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will leave that jurisprudential argument for another day. At the very
least, the crafting of reasoned, orderly structures of logic has the
potential to create the appearance of fair and rational decision-
making and to inspire the confidence upon which the consent of the
governed may be based.
From the opposite perspective, to those who may suggest that
arguing about whether objectivity in judicial decision-making can
exist is pass6, a relic of a bygone era,6 1 can only note that I continue
to hear the argument raised in conversations among colleagues that in
this post-realist world, everyone should know that decision-making is
never fully objective, and decision-makers will never escape their
biases. I suggest, at the very least again, that even if perfection is not
ours to have, we can make considerable progress towards that goal,
and we certainly cannot approach it if we do not make a concerted
effort.
Encouraging considerable progress may be on the minds of the
Justices as well. Implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion of
patentable subject matter is the message that judicial decision-making
can be done better.
In particular, one of the most striking parts of a recent Supreme
Court decision on Section 101 of the Patent Code, which is the section
on Patentable Subject Matter, occurs when the majority says the
following:
Nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing
interpretations of section 101 that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has used in the past.7
"In other words," the Supreme Court justices are saying to the
Federal Circuit, "we disagree with everything you have ever had to
say about the topic in your 30-year history." Implicit in such criticism
may be the suggestion that the Federal Circuit is going about its work
in the wrong way, and this essay will highlight other suggestions in the
case law to the same effect.
(1.998) (hypothesizing that extralegal factors have a "modest" effect on judicial behavior);
Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2007) (positing that judges sometimes override their intuitions by deliberation).
6. See Stephen J. Morse, An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There a Cure?: An
Appreciation of The Role of Science in Law by Robin Feldman, 3 HASTINGS SC. & TECH.
L.J. 157, 160 (2011) ("These claims are 'crit tics,' which are boilerplate-type observations
arising from critical theory.").
7. Bilski, 561 U.S. __, slip. op. at 4.
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In short, this essay looks at the way in which the Federal Circuit
has been going about its work in patentable subject matter and the
criticisms embodied in the Supreme Court's disapproval of that
approach. It also sets out potential approaches to make the content
of patentable subject matter jurisprudence consistent with the
Supreme Court's desires. Part I of the essay describes recent
Supreme Court cases on patentable subject matter, and those who are
familiar with the topic may wish to skip this section. Part II
illuminates the underlying conversation between the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit, describing what the Supreme Court is
striving for and the ways in which the Federal Circuit's decision-
making falls short. This part also discusses the ways in which the
Supreme Court's most recent attempt to demonstrate its
jurisprudential approach falls short of its own dictates. Finally, Part
III describes an approach to patentable subject matter that solves the
devilishly difficult problems in patentable subject matter in a manner
that is consistent with the Supreme Court's aspirations.
1. Recent Supreme Court Cases in Patentable Subject Matter
The current morass in patentable subject matter lies at the
tangled intersection of computer technology, life sciences, financial
services, and the Internet. Just listing the types of inventions
involved-not to mention the range of private, commercial, and
public interest actors with a stake in the outcome-is enough to give
anyone a headache, and the flood of amicus briefs filed with the cases
reflects the level of interest and anxiety.
Section 101 of the Patent Act, which is understood to delineate
the boundaries of patentable subject matter, notes only that "whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter" may obtain a patent.8
Limitations on patentable subject matter have emerged, not from the
language of the statute itself, but through case law. Although the
words used to describe the categories of things that do not constitute
the proper subject matter of a patent have shifted from one Supreme
Court case to another, the forbidden categories at various times have
included laws of nature, natural phenomena, mathematical formulas,
mental steps, and abstract ideas.9
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (West 2012).
9. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (listing all of these categories);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 195 (1981) (listing all of these categories); Bilski, 561
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The current confusion centers on patents related to methods of
doing things.'0 The seeds were planted by a Federal Circuit decision
in 1998 that allowed patents on business methods. For much of the
20th century, courts had excluded methods of doing business from the
list of patentable subject matter, but in 1998, the Federal Circuit
upheld business methods as a legitimate subject for patents in the
State Street Bank case," finding that prior cases had actually rested on
concerns unrelated to patentable subject matter. The patent that the
Federal Circuit upheld in State Street concerned a computerized hub
and spoke accounting system for structuring mutual fund investments,
but many business method patents granted in the subsequent years
covered far less sophisticated inventions. These included a method of
teaching janitors how to vacuum and a method of making toilet
reservations for airplane travelers.' 2 As one dissenting judge noted,
"[p]atents granted in the wake of State Street have ranged from the
somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd.., producing a thunderous
chorus of criticism.
' '1
3
The question of whether or how to limit business method
patents, however, implicates a number of other areas of invention.
Business methods are essentially ways of going about doing
something. Language that might limit business method patents,
U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221, 3230, 3233 (2010) (listing all of these categories);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (listing laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853)
(listing only abstract principles); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 15 How. 62, 132 (1854)
(listing only principles of nature).
10. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, at ch. 4, Where Do Processes
of Nature End and Processes of Human Invention Begin? (Harvard 2012), for a detailed
history of the unfolding of the modern problems in patentable subject matter. The recent
academic literature on patentable subject matter is even more voluminous than the amicus
briefs. See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L.
TECH. & INTERNET 1 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/
files/eisenberg.wisdomordeadhand.patentlyo.pdf, for a particularly thorough and
interesting review of the cases, and one cited by the Supreme Court itself.
11. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
12. See U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (filed Apr. 23, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919
(filed Aug. 14, 1999) (patenting a system and method for providing reservations for
restroom use). IBM later renounced the patent, declaring that "We dedicated that patent
to the public so that we could continue focusing on our high-quality patent portfolio." See
Troy Wolverton, IBM Flushes Restroom Patent, CNET NEWS (Oct. 11, 2002),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-961803.html.
13. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 989, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
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therefore, might also be applied to patents on computer software,
which may be expressed in terms of ways of going about getting a
machine to do something. Limitations on business methods might
also implicate diagnostic and therapeutic patents in the biotechnology
space, which may be expressed as methods of diagnosis and treatment
by doing something. Such limitations could also implicate patents on
things like genes and antibodies, which, as I will describe below, are a
strange combination of a product and a method of going about doing
something.
In cases following State Street, the lower courts struggled to
establish a test for patentable subject matter that could successfully
navigate all of these areas while remaining faithful to the few
Supreme Court cases in the arena. The Federal Circuit considered a
"physical transformation" test, then tried out a "useful, concrete, and
tangible" test, and finally moved on to the "machine or
transformation test," with none of these remotely capable of
addressing the issues in a consistent and comprehensive manner."
Problems in the area were compounded by the few
pronouncements that the Supreme Court had made on the topic. In
the late 1970s and early '80s, the Court handed down a series of
patentable subject matter cases in an attempt to deal with the strange
new worlds of computers and genetic engineering. Reflecting deep
divisions among the Justices, the decisions were less than a model of
clarity, and the Court retreated into silence on the issue for decades.
The following discussion will describe those cases from the 1970s
and 1980s, and explain the lack of clarity for the lower courts.
Specifically, in the biotechnology arena, the Supreme Court in 1980
had granted patent protection to a living organism in the case of
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.'5 The patent holder in Chakrabarty had
claimed a new bacterium obtained through genetic engineering. The
bacterium was capable of breaking down multiple components of
crude oil, something that no naturally occurring living organism
could do. The general view at the time was that the Patent &
Trademark Office wanted to grant patents to newly created living
organisms but felt that the legal precedents were insufficient and that,
as a regulatory body, it lacked the authority to reach that far. Thus,
although denying the patent, the PTO was hoping that its decision
14. See In re Alappat 33 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 989 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). See also FELDMAN, supra note 10, for a more detailed discussion of the
evolution of these tests.
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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would be reversed and that courts would open the door for the
patenting of new living organisms.
One could suggest, perhaps, that Chakrabarty is an example of
what happens when both sides of the courtroom want the same result
and neither is pressing too hard on the logic required to get there.
Perhaps overstates the case, given that four Justices did file a
dissenting opinion. Nevertheless, there were curious moments in the
opinion, of the type that one would not expect to see in a fully
adversarial process. For example, in support of its conclusion that
"the relevant legislative history... supports a broad construction" of
patentable subject matter, the Court noted the following:
The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us
that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man."'6
The quote, however, which may have been taken from one of the
parties' briefs, is out of context. 7 The original words were intended
not to convey a broad notion of patentable subject matter but to
convey the opposite. The full quote is the following:
A person may have "invented" a machine or a manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man,
but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the
conditions of the title are fulfilled.'
8
It is an error that the Supreme Court finally rectified 32 years
later, in the 2012 Prometheus opinion."
16. Id. at 308-09 (citing S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
17. The following briefs use the truncated quote in support of an expansive
interpretation of the statute. See Brief for Respondent at 38, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136); Brief on behalf of Genentech, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at
6, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136); Brief on Behalf of the New York Patent
Law Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 9, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-
136); Brief of Dr. Leroy E. Hood et al. as Amici Curiae at 18, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980) (No. 79-136); Brief of Cornell D. Cornish as Amicus Curiae at 6, Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136).
18. See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2399; H.R.
Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2399.
19. For one of the few judicial opinions to note the error, see, for example, In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that although the quote is used
to suggest that Congress intended anything under the sun to be patentable, the legislative
history says no such thing). For the language in the Prometheus case reflecting the full
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In the end, the Supreme Court noted in Chakrabarty that the
relevant distinction was not between living organisms and inanimate
objects, but between products of nature and human-made
inventions.2 If the patent holder has produced a new organism "with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one
having the potential for significant utility," the Court concluded "[h]is
discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own" and therefore
patentable subject matter." Thus, Chakrabarty ushered in the era of
biotechnology patents. The lower courts would expand the
Chakrabarty decision, granting patents to higher order creatures, such
as mice and sheep, and to the components of life, such as genes,
proteins, and antibodies.
In the computer arena, the Supreme Court decided two cases
that seem almost indistinguishable in every way, other than the fact
that the Court reached the opposite result in each. The 1978 case of
Parker v. Flookz concerned catalytic conversion systems, which
reduce the toxicity of emissions released by many types of vehicle
engines. The Court in Flook rejected a patent on a process for
programing an alarm to signal that the conversion is reaching a
danger point, which would allow the engine to suspend the
conversion at the optimal time. The process used a computer formula
and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the proper moment to
trigger the alarm, based on a series of changing factors.
The Court in Flook decided that the formula in the process was a
computer algorithm. The court then ruled that a computer algorithm
is analogous to a mathematical formula or a law of nature, and that as
such, it falls outside patentable subject matter. Given that all other
elements of the process were well-known, and the Court had ruled
the algorithm unpatentable, the Court rejected the patent. Justice
Stevens authored the opinion.
The decision in Flook, however, stood in contrast to
developments throughout modern technology at the time. Computer
programs may have been strange new beasts in patent law, but they
were rapidly becoming integral to the types of industrial inventions
quotation in its proper context, see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303-04 (2012).
20. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
21. Id. at 310.
22. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). As mentioned above, I have described the
history, content, and implications of these cases [before, and] in far greater detail, in
FELDMAN, supra note 10.
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more familiar to the Court. A categorical denial of patent protections
for computer programs seemed more and more discordant, as the
introduction of computer programs throughout ordinary industrial
inventions made these programs look more like a type of applied art
than an abstraction or a law of nature.
A mere three years after Flook, the Supreme Court headed in a
very different direction in the case of Diamond v. Diehr.3 This time,
Justice Stevens could only author a dissent, in the face of a majority
that was willing to uphold the patent.
In Diehr, the patent holder claimed the process of constantly
measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber-curing mold and
feeding those measurements into a computer that would use a
formula to repeatedly recalculate the time limit for the mold to be
opened. The majority found the invention patentable, deciding that
although the invention included an equation, the inventors were
merely patenting a process for curing rubber, rather than trying to
patent an equation itself.
An endless stream of commentators have noted that the
inventions were quite similar, a similarity that I would describe in the
following manner: Diehr was a process for updating the moment that
rubber-curing should end, using a computerized formula and a set of
steps to constantly recalculate the relevant moment to open the mold,
based on a series of changing factors. Flook was a process for
updating the moment that catalytic conversion should end, using a
computerized formula and a set of steps to constantly recalculate the
relevant moment, based on a series of changing factors. Expressed in
terms like these, the inventions are strikingly similar. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court upheld the patent in Diehr, concluding that it was
a different kind of invention from the one denied in Flook. The
Court characterized the invention in Diehr as "an improved process
for molding rubber articles," while it described the Flook invention as
nothing more than a formula for computing a number.'
The Federal Circuit later extended the logic of the Diehr opinion
to cover not only computer programs imbedded in industrial
machinery but also computer programs standing alone. The Supreme
23. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
24. Compare id. at 181, with id. at 186.
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Court, however, would say nothing further on patentable subject
matter for the next 24 years.2
The Supreme Court's first modern indication of its interest in
patentable subject matter cases appeared in an aborted attempt to
address the issue in 2005, by granting certiorari in the case of
LabCorp v. Metabolite.26 The patent in LabCorp revolved around
homocysteine, an amino acid that is produced through natural
processes in the human body. 2 For more than 50 years, doctors have
known that high levels of homocysteine are associated with numerous
serious health problems, but the reasons for that connection remain
unclear. The patent holders were able to figure out a piece of that
elusive connection by determining that high levels of total
homocysteine are indicative of deficiencies in folic acid and vitamin
B12.
Doctors already knew that deficiencies in folic acid and B12
could be linked to serious health problems. In particular, pregnant
women who lack sufficient amounts of folic acid in their system run a
far greater risk of delivering a baby with the severe birth defect spina
bifida. Measuring folic acid and B12 in the body, however, is difficult.
Thus, finding a correlation between high homocysteine levels, which
can be measured in the blood, and deficiencies in folic acid and B12
allowed doctors to search for these vitamin deficiencies indirectly by
measuring total homocysteine in the blood.
The accused infringer filed for certiorari on issues related to
patentable subject matter, arguing that the patent holder was trying
to claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship/i Perhaps
anticipating the firestorm that would emerge, the Solicitor General's
office recommended against taking the case, suggesting that the issues
necessary to address the question had not been fully argued below.
In particular, the Solicitor General noted pointedly that, "if this Court
were to consider reevaluating almost a quarter-century of
25. Although I have ordered these cases by category, their history is more intricately
intertwined. For a detailed description of their history, see the summary in Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. at 306-07.
26. See Labcorp v. Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
27. 1 discuss this and other patentable subject matter cases in detail in FELDMAN,
supra note 10.
2& See LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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administrative practice and lower court jurisprudence, it should do so
based on a full record." 29
The Court politely ignored the suggestion, granting certiorari in
the fall of 2005. By the time the Justices heard oral argument in the
case in early 2006, much had transpired. A flood of amicus briefs
poured into the Court from academics, medical professionals, the
biotechnology industry, business organizations, financial service
organizations, computer manufacturers, and software
manufacturers. 30 Each group worried about the possible implications
any LabCorp decision might have on patents in its domain. In
addition to the cacophony of concerns, the makeup of the court had
changed, with Justice Alito replacing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in
January of 2006. Following oral argument, a majority of the Court
belatedly accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion, dismissing the
case as improvidently granted without further comment.
Justice Breyer, however, authored a dissent to the dismissal that
was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. The fact that only three
Justices signed the dissent is interesting, given that a new Justice had
arrived on the Court since the Court had accepted the case. It takes
four votes to grant certiorari." I will always wonder whether Justice
O'Connor filed the fourth vote for granting certiorari in the case,
leaving the other three to soldier on without her in the case when she
left the Court.
The three dissenting Justices saw sufficient information in the
record to deny patentability to the invention as falling outside the
scope of patentable subject matter. Specifically, the Justices argued
that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency
constitutes no more than a natural phenomenon."
Perhaps the most interesting sections of the dissent can be found
in the Justices' discussion of why they felt their brethren should not
have dismissed the case. The dissenting Justices argued that, "[elven
if [our analysis] is wrong, it still would be valuable to decide this
case," because it would "help diminish legal uncertainty in the area"
29. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, LabCorp, 548 U.S. 124
(2006) (No. 04-607).
30. For a summary of the issues raised in amicus briefs by the various interest groups,
see FELDMAN, supra note 10.
31. See PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2010) (explaining that "the votes of only four Justices
are required to grant certiorari").
32. See LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 135 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and help Congress determine whether legislation might be needed,
for example, to protect doctors from liability.33
The dissenting Justices also sent a pointed message to the
Federal Circuit about the approach it had been taking in patentable
subject matter. Given that the Federal Circuit had not directly
addressed patentable subject matter, it had not directly applied any
patentable subject matter test in LabCorp. Nevertheless, the
dissenting Justices took the opportunity to express their disapproval
of a test that the Federal Circuit had been using in other patentable
subject matter cases, including those outside of biotechnology.
Talking about the Federal Circuit's notion that a process is patentable
if it produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result, the dissenting
Justices commented that "this Court has never made such a statement
and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this
Court has held to the contrary.""
In short, the Justices signaled quite strongly their view that the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in patentable subject matter was in
unacceptable disarray and that the Court had been silent long
enough. It would simply be a matter of time before the right case
came along.
That case arrived in the form of a business method case titled,
Bilski v. Kappos 5 The patent holder in Bilski claimed a patent on a
method of hedging risk in the energy commodity industry. The
Federal Circuit had upheld the patent, applying the latest in its series
of tests for patentable subject matter. This latest approach was the
so-called "machine-or-transformation test."
The flood of amicus briefs in Bilski made the ones in LabCorp
look like a gentle stream. More than 70 briefs were filed-supporting
one side, supporting the other side, or supporting no sides. They
were filed by interest groups, industry groups, academics, individual
entities, and more. As described above, any decision in the case, and
any language used, had the potential to significantly impact not only
business method patents but also patents in biotechnology, software,
and a host of other areas.
While the Bilski case was pending at the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit decided the case of Prometheus v. Mayo.' The patent
33. Id. at 138.
34. Id. at 136.
35. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. _ , 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
36. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009). 1 have described the Prometheus case at length in other works as well. See
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at issue in Prometheus concerned methods for calibrating the proper
dosage of a certain category of medicines for gastrointestinal
disorders. The method involved administering the drug to a patient,
determining the level of the drug's metabolites in the patient's
system, and then correlating the level of the metabolite in the blood
with ranges that the inventor had determined to decide whether the
drug needed to be increased of decreased.
In upholding the patent, the Federal Circuit used a remarkably
flexible interpretation of the notion of "transformation" in its
machine-or-transformation test. Prior to Prometheus, the Federal
Circuit had described the transformation prong of the test as a
consideration of whether the invention "transforms" a particular
article into a different state or thing. This notion fit well with the
Supreme Court's suggestion that the rubber-curing invention in Diehr
was proper. There, one could clearly see an industrial process
transforming raw ingredients into perfectly molded rubber.
In Prometheus, however, the Federal Circuit applied a far more
expansive notion of "transformation," and one that arguably
stretched it to the breaking point. The Federal Circuit found that the
invention constituted transformation because the drugs were
transformed as they were metabolized in the patient's body and the
patient's body was transformed by receiving the drug. Under this
interpretation, most inventions in the field of life sciences could pass
muster; all of them would involve transformation of a human patient
through treatment, although not all as directly as the transformation
involved in digesting a medication.
The Federal Circuit may, indeed, have intended such a sweeping
result. Recall that the Federal Circuit's decision in Prometheus came
down during the time that Bilski was pending at the Supreme Court.
A number of amicus briefs in Bilski had raised concerns that the
Federal Circuit's machine-or-transformation test would be
devastating for inventions in biotechnology and the life sciences. The
Federal Circuit's opinion in Prometheus may have been the Circuit's
way of trying to signal the Supreme Court that all would be well
under the machine-or-transformation test. "Health care has nothing
to worry about; we will get this right," was the implicit message.
A test that simply swept up all inventions in the life sciences had
the virtue of protecting innovations in this important arena, but it
FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 117-29; Robin Feldman & Deborah Furth, The Intellectual
Property Landscape for iPS Cells, 3 STANFORD J.L. SCI. & POLICY 16 (2010) (peer
review).
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came at the price of defensible logic. How could the test offer courts
the ability to clearly differentiate between patentable and non-
patentable subject matter if it could be molded so drastically in
different circumstances. As one would see across time, the
Prometheus plea would be insufficient to save either the machine-or-
transformation test or the invention in Prometheus.
Returning to the Bilski case, which was still pending when the
Federal Circuit sent up its Prometheus smoke signals, Bilski was
argued before the Supreme Court in October of 2009. Patent
bloggers and patent mavens began watching for the opinion in the
winter of 2010. As the weeks dragged on, however, it was clear that
the Justices were having some difficulty coming to a meeting of the
minds. In fact, the decision would not be released until the following
summer, in the last week of the Court's term.
The claims in the Bilski patent were so broad and general that
most people expected the Supreme Court to invalidate the patent and
overturn the Federal Circuit. Indeed, all of the Justices did agree that
the patent should be invalidated, but they agreed on very little else.
There were three separate opinions, with two of them oddly
bifurcated. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
which stood as the opinion of the court, except as to Parts II.B.2 and
II.C.2. Justice Scalia declined to join those parts, although he joined
the remainder of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Kennedy for the full
opinion.
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Breyer
also filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined only as
to Part II.
Justice Stevens' opinion reads as if it had originally been written
as the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens, of course, had authored
the dissenting opinion in Diehr, where he would have invalidated the
computer-related rubber-curing invention. Numerous scholars and
commentators have speculated that the Stevens opinion was
originally intended as the majority opinion but that he could not
obtain a sufficient coalition, so the majority shifted to Kennedy. 7
37. See, e.g., Joseph J. Berghammer et al., Bilski v. Kappos: Some Business Methods
Still Patentable After All These Years, 3 LANDSLIDE 26,28 (2010); Michael Risch, Forward
to the Past, 2010 CATO S. Cr. REVIEW 333, 351 (2010); John Duffy, Bilski, Kenny Rogers,
and Supreme Court Rule 46, PATENTLY-O BLOG (June 25, 2010), http://www.patentlyo
.com/patent/2010/06/bilski-kenny-rogers-and-supreme-court-rule46.htm; Tom Goldstein,
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The majority's opinion in Bilski left many questions unanswered.
The Supreme Court did not overturn the machine-or-transformation
test completely. However, the Court opined that while machine-or-
transformation may be an "important clue" or "investigative tool" for
determining patentability, it could not be the sole measure. 8 The
Court directed the Federal Circuit's attention back to the line of cases
that included Flook and Diehr for the notion that abstract ideas do
not constitute the proper subject matter for patents, but the Supreme
Court left to the Federal Circuit the task of developing additional
tests in the arena.
Perhaps the only clear messages to emerge from the Bilski
opinion were the following: First, the notion of preemption would be
key to any determinations in patentable subject matter. The Court's
core concern revolved around whether granting the patent at issue
would preempt or block out an entire abstract idea. Second, the
Supreme Court disapproved of everything that the Federal Circuit
had said in this arena, which is evident from the striking quote
discussed above. 9
Following the decision in Bilski, the Supreme Court remanded
Prometheus to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration. The Federal
Circuit on remand, however, did not show much of an inclination to
change its ways in response to the Court's admonitions in Bilski.
Rather, the Federal Circuit emphasized that although the Supreme
Court had not endorsed machine-or-transformation as the sole test, it
also had not overturned the test. Thus, the Federal Circuit decided
that machine-or-transformation was still the appropriate test for the
circumstances in the Prometheus medicine calibration case.'  It
upheld the patent again.
The Federal Circuit did add one more detail in its decision after
remand in Prometheus. The Circuit held that not only did the
invention satisfy the transformation prong of the test by transforming
Business Method Patents Nearly Bite the Dust, SCOTUSBLOG (July 6, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/business-method-patents-nearly-bite-the-dust; John
Schwartz, Justices Take Broad View of Business Method Patents, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/business/29patent.html?_&_r=O. See also
Kedar Bhatia, The Odd Opinion Distribution of OT 09, DAILY WRIT (July 6, 2010),
http://dailywrit.com/2OlO/07/the-odd-opinion-distribution-of-ot-09/ (noting that Justice
Stevens did not author any majority opinions in November 2009).
3& See Bilski, 561 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
39. See supra text accompanying note 7.
40. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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the patient, the invention also satisfied the transformation prong of
test because blood was transformed in the lab during the process of
testing for the level of the metabolite.
The court added this point to deal with a problem that had arisen
in the Patent & Trademark Office's (PTO) interpretation of the
original Prometheus decision. Although the court intended
Prometheus to grant broad patentability to all life science innovations,
the PTO had taken a narrow stance. The PTO had interpreted the
notion that "a patient is transformed in the course of the invention"
to mean that approval would be granted to only those inventions in
which the physician decided to treat the patient. For inventions in
which the physician ran the test, interpreted the results, and chose not
to treat a patient with the particular approach, the PTO would deny
patentability on the grounds that no transformation had occurred."
Under this interpretation, the PTO would be denying numerous
inventions in the medical diagnostic space in which one might
evaluate certain physical or genetic factors for a patient and decide
that a particular course of treatment might not be beneficial. The
Federal Circuit solved this pesky problem by adding the notion that
the blood is transformed during the testing so that transformation
could be found even if the physician chose not to use a particular
treatment.
In adding the new twist, however, the Federal Circuit ran up
against its earlier decision in the case of In re Grams.'2 The Grams
inventor had listed a claim with a tremendously broad reach.
Specifically, the inventor claimed, as a general matter, the process of
(1) performing a clinical test on individuals, and (2) based on the data
from that test, determining if an abnormality existed, and (3)
determining possible causes of any abnormality by using an
algorithm. The Federal Circuit, not surprisingly, had rejected the
patent in Grams.
One could argue that in carrying out the Grams invention, the
medical professionals who performed the clinical tests, by necessity,
would have transformed the blood or other tissue samples. Thus,
under the Federal Circuit's approach in Prometheus, the Grams
invention would have satisfied the "transformation" prong of the test.
41. See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Office Action," Application No.
11/338,957 (Mar. 3, 2010), at 4-6. For additional explanation of how this approach was
playing out in PTO decisions, see FELDMAN, supra note 10, at text accompanying ch. 4
note 99.
42. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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The Federal Circuit tried to resolve the tension with some creative
hand-waving, by suggesting that the clinical tests in Grams were for
the purposes of obtaining data while the clinical tests in Prometheus
were for the purposes of treating the patient. The ultimate aim of
both inventions, however, involved the treatment of the human
patient, making the Federal Circuit's distinction difficult to discern.43
The Prometheus decision after remand offers an example of what
I described in the opening as "death by tinkering." Here, the Federal
Circuit had a problem with its stated test, a problem indicative of
weakness in the underlying logic. Rather than rethinking the test, the
Circuit made a small adjustment that appeared to solve its immediate
problem, while creating even greater inconsistency and illogic
throughout the doctrinal area.
Following the Federal Circuit's decision on remand, the Supreme
Court again granted certiorari in the case, now styled Mayo v.
Prometheus. In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court
reversed the Federal Circuit, finding that the invention in Prometheus
did not constitute patentable subject matter.
In surprising contrast to the divided opinions of Bilski, the
decision in Prometheus was unanimous. The unanimity of the court,
as well as authorship of the opinion by Justice Breyer, could suggest
that Prometheus was the case for which Justice Breyer had been
waiting and preparing his colleagues since his original shot across the
bow in LabCorp. Both of the cases concern approaches to diagnosing
and treating a patient based on correlations that the inventor had
developed between the level of certain substances in the blood and
the patient's disease state. Broadly speaking, both are examples of
the emerging field of personalized medicine, which I will discuss
further below.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Mayo v.
Prometheus opens with a discussion of the Court's prior decisions in
patentable subject matter. It reads almost like a tutorial-one on
putting together a group of cases to form a coherent doctrinal path or
a brief to an appellate court. Of particular note in the opening
section is the Court's admonition that patent eligibility cannot
"depend simply on the draftsman's art. ' ' 4 The Court also
characterizes its prior precedents as warning against upholding
43. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 120-21 (describing problems with the Federal
Circuit's treatment of In re Grams in the Prometheus decision).
44. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. _, slip op.
at 3, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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process patents that preempt the use of a natural law.45 These
precedents, explains the Court, insist that process claims contain
some inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent amounts
to significantly more than a patent on the natural law itself.'
The Court found that the range of levels at which a particular
drug's metabolite would indicate a need for more or less medication
should be considered a natural law. Therefore, upholding the patent
would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the natural law.47 In
addition, outside of the part of the patent that had been found to
constitute a natural law, the Court found that the invention consisted
of no more than well-known, routine steps.8
Regarding the machine-or-transformation test, the Court
disagreed with the result that the Federal Circuit reached in applying
the test and also with the Federal Circuit's decision under the
circumstances to apply the test in the first place. First, the Supreme
Court explained that the invention would not satisfy the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test because
the types of transformation identified by the Federal Circuit in the
case were insufficient.49  On the Federal Circuit's notion of
transforming the patient by administering the drug, the Supreme
Court found that such activity is "irrelevant" to the transformation
question.' Rather, the Supreme Court focused on the
"administering" aspect of the activity and argued that administering
the drug involved no more than helping to "pick out the group of
individuals ... interested in applying the law of nature."'" Although
the opinion does not specify, the Justices appeared to be thinking of
the patients taking the drug as being the individuals applying the law
of nature. At other places in the opinion, the Justices suggest that the
doctors, rather than the patients, are the relevant audience interested
in applying the law of nature." Thinking of doctors, who are
practicing their scientific craft, as the audience interested in applying
the law of nature makes more sense intuitively than the notion of the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 19-20.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 9.
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patient as the one applying the law of nature. The latter conjures up
the notion of patients treating themselves.
On the Federal Circuit's suggestion that the "transformation"
also occurs because the blood sample necessarily is transformed in the
process of testing it to determine the metabolite level, the Supreme
Court ruled that this step has the potential to be satisfied without any
transformation, if science develops a way to measure metabolite
levels without a blood test. Thinking about technology that does not
exist is an unusual approach in patent law, but the Justices may have
been thinking about problems that can occur when the law allows
patents to reach beyond the state of the art at the time of the
invention." The Justices may have been suggesting broadly that in
defining the appropriate range of patentable subject matter, one
should contemplate not only the preemptive effects that might occur
today but also the preemptive effects that might occur in the future as
technology advances. This could be a fruitful concept for lower
courts to keep in mind in the context of defining questions about the
scope of patents and the breadth of patentable subject matter.54
In addition to rejecting the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the
concept of transformation, the Supreme Court also held that the
entire machine-or-transformation test was irrelevant for the case:
[In] stating that the "machine-or-transformation" test is an
"important and useful clue" to patentability, we have neither
said nor implied that the test trumps the "law of nature"
exclusion. That being so, the test fails here.55
In other words, the invention would fail the test if the court were
to apply it, but the test itself fails to fit the analysis required in the
case. With these pronouncements, the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit and rejected the patent, leaving courts and
commentators to pour over every word of the opinion in search of
clues to what might satisfy the Court in patentable subject matter in
the future.
Shortly after the decision in Prometheus, the Supreme Court
remanded the case of Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office for reconsideration in light of Prometheus.
53. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at ch. 6, Beyond the State of the Art.
54. See id. (arguing that patents should not be defined to reach beyond the state of
the art at the time of the invention).
55. See Prometheus, 566 U.S.-, slip op. at 19 (citations omitted).
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Colloquially known as the Myriad case, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology considered whether patents on isolated gene sequences
and related products could constitute patentable subject matter. The
case also included diagnostic claims similar to the ones in Prometheus
as well as other types of claims. The remand signaled that the
Supreme Court intended Prometheus and Bilski to apply broadly to a
variety of subject matter patentability questions, not just the
categories of inventions specifically at issue in those cases.
II. The Conversation
The prior section of this essay set out the details of the cases
through which the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have
carried out their conversation. This section will describe the
conversation itself.
Following the aborted attempt in LabCorp, the conversation
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit began in earnest
in Bilski. (Bilski is the case that concerned patentability of a business
method for commodity hedging.) As described above, in reversing
the Federal Circuit, five Justices signed portions of the Bilski opinion
that included language expressing simple and complete disapproval of
everything the Federal Circuit has ever said about patentable subject
matter.6 How is it possible that the Federal Circuit has said nothing
that the Supreme Court Justices wish to support?
Implicit in this mild-mannered but remarkably stark criticism is
the suggestion that the Federal Circuit has been going about its work
in the wrong way. What is it, then, that the Circuit has been doing
improperly?
Understanding the content of the message requires putting Bilski
and Prometheus together, and the message plays out in three
different, but related, strands. The first strand concerns the
appropriate way to create doctrinal tests, such as the one the Federal
Circuit crafted when it designated "machine-or-transformation" as
the way to determine whether a claimed invention constitutes a law of
nature. One could describe what the Supreme Court is complaining
about as logical faithfulness-that is, in creating the doctrinal test, are
you faithful to the underlying legal concept?
The Supreme Court's message begins in Bilski, when the Court
explained that machine-or-transformation is an important and useful
56. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. -, slip op. at 4 (2010).
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clue, and an investigative tool, but not the sole test.57 When the
Federal Circuit failed to respond as the Justices had hoped, the
Justices amplified that comment in Prometheus by saying the
following:
[I]n stating that the "machine-or-transformation" test is an
"important and useful clue" to patentability, we have neither
said nor implied that the test trumps the "law of nature"
exclusion.58
It is as if the Justices were saying to the Federal Circuit, "you are
not asking the questions right. Yes, you have a piece of the puzzle,
but there is a problem with your use of proxies (such as machine-or-
transformation; useful, concrete, and tangible, etc.). It isn't that
everything embodied in the proxy is wrong; the problem is that you
are forgetting what the proxies are testing for and allowing the
proxies to take on a life of their own."
In the second strand of the message, the Supreme Court took
aim at the Federal Circuit's willingness to drift unmoored from
precedent-be it legislative or judicial. On the issue of fidelity to
legislative language, the Supreme Court chided the Federal Circuit,
arguing that adopting machine-or-transformation as the sole test for
patentable subject matter for process patents would violate principles
of statutory interpretation.59 The Court pointed out that the Patent
Act specifically defines the term "process" to mean "process, art or
method[.] ' The Court then noted dryly that it was unaware of any
ordinary meaning of the definitional terms "process, art or method"
that would require them either to be tied to a machine or to
transform an article.6'
On the judicial front, the Supreme Court turned to Gottschalk v.
Benson, its own 1972 case from which the Federal Circuit would
eventually derive the requirement that all process patents must
constitute either a machine or transformation. The Justices pointed
out that the Benson opinion explicitly rejects that notion.6
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 7; 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
61. See Bilski, 561 U.S. , slip. op. at 7.
62. Id.
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It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change
articles or materials to a "different state or thing." We do
not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did
not meet the[se] requirements .... 63
In general, the Federal Circuit has been extraordinarily sloppy
about following precedent, either its own or precedent set by the
Supreme Court. Failing to keep its own house in order, the Circuit
has allowed open splits to languish for extended periods of time, as
some panels flatly refuse to follow the path established by prior panel
decisions." Moreover, Federal Circuit decisions have been less than
faithful to precedent from above.6
Although there are multiple causes for the Federal Circuit's
difficulties, to some extent, the problems reflect the Federal Circuit's
tolerance for discordance. This is apparent both procedurally, in
terms of not cleaning up its own deviations, and substantively, in
terms of doctrinal areas that do not work together as a logical whole.
The notion of discordance leads to the third and most important
63. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,70 (1972).
64. See, e.g., At. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1.992) (Rich, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) (arguing that a later panel's
refusal to follow circuit precedent was not only insulting to colleagues, "it is mutiny. It is
heresy. It is illegal."); Univ. of Rochester v. G. D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Rader, J., dissenting) (denial of reh'g en banc) (citing a 2002 government brief
politely point out that "although this Court has addressed the 'written description'
requirement of section 112 on a number of occasions, its decisions have not taken a clear
and uniform position regarding the purpose and meaning of the requirement."). See also
Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEXAS INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 300-01 (2009)
(discussing unresolved splits in the product-by-process doctrine and the written
description doctrine that persisted for an extended period of time); Albert Tramposch,
The Dilemma of Conflicting Precedent: Three Options in the Federal Circuit, 17 AIPLA
Q.J. 323 (1989) (describing three options for efficient resolution of conflicting precedent);
Gregory S. Maskel, Product-by-Process Patent Claim Construction: Resolving the Federal
Circuit's Conflicting Precedent, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 115
(2006) (describing split concerning process patents and offering a resolution); Michael A.
Leonard I1, The Death of the Written Description Requirement? Analysis and Potential
Outcomes of the Ariad Case, 158 INTELL. PROP. COUNSELOR ARTICLE 1I (2010)
(explaining conflicting rulings on the written description requirement).
65. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 72 F.3d 857
(Fed. Cir. 1997), rev'd by 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (deviating from decision of Supreme Court
on the grounds that it found the test unworkable); cf Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United
States, 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (majority panel opinion noting that the dissenting
judge relied upon a case that stands for the opposite proposition). See also Feldman, supra
note 64 (describing failure to follow precedent in doctrine of patent misuse that continues
today).
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strand in the Supreme Court's message to the Federal Circuit. One
could describe this line of complaint as related to logical coherence.
As described in Part I, the Federal Circuit all too frequently has
been drawn towards doctrinal rules that resolve the issue of the
moment but lack general applicability and logical coherence. The
approach feels comfortable, because the outcome of the case is
acceptable, but the resulting doctrines are intellectually and
operationally unsatisfying. Moreover, the cases produce what I
would describe as death by tinkering-change a little piece here and a
little piece there until the entire area threatens to collapse of its own
weight.
A classic example of the approach can be seen in the Federal
Circuit's decision in the gene patenting case, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology. In a concurring opinion, Judge Moore noted that
although gene sequences when isolated in a lab do have literal
chemical differences from gene sequences as they exist in the human
body, it is not clear that these distinctions make any meaningful
difference.6
Identifying a literal difference is an insufficient basis for any legal
decision.67 One must ask why the difference matters in the full
doctrinal framework of the question: What are we really trying to
establish, not just for gene sequences or even life science patents, but
for patents as a whole?
The same type of problem arose in the Federal Circuit's analysis
of the invention in Prometheus. Recall that the Federal Circuit on
remand had determined that the invention satisfies the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test because
the process involves transformation of the human body or
transformation of blood taken from the human body.6 As noted
above, the test stretches the notion of transformation to the breaking
point, potentially sweeping all medical inventions under the
protective wing of transformation.6 The interpretation also conflicts
66. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1364-65 (Moore, J., concurring), vacated, appeal reinstated by Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 Fed.App'x. 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
67. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 111 (noting that while scientists can tell us how
things are different, they cannot tell us whether that difference should matter in the
context of the legal doctrines at hand).
6& See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. See also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. ____, slip. op. 19 (noting that the transformation of
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with other Federal Circuit decisions, further indicating weakness in
the underlying logic of the test." Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed the test, making a small adjustment to resolve the
immediate problems, which created ever more inconsistency and
unworkable logic throughout the doctrine.
In response, the Supreme Court's opinion in Prometheus is rife
with language pushing the Federal Circuit towards improving its
doctrinal approach. When the Court said that it wanted to see
"practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort,"
and later when the Court complained about patent language that has
the effect of "simply appending conventional steps specified at a high
level of generality," the Court was partly speaking to the patent bar
about the documents it had drafted. The Court also, however,
appeared to be speaking to the Federal Circuit, suggesting that it
should straighten up the mess that its decisions have wrought.
One could characterize the Supreme Court's pronouncements as
a preference for flexible standards rather than bright-line rules." The
Supreme Court certainly has rejected the bright-line approaches, such
as machine-or-transformation and concrete/useful/tangible, that the
Federal Circuit has offered. My own view is that the Supreme
Court's decisions are an encouragement towards systems of more
comprehensive logic. The Court is not saying that you may not have
bright-line rules; it is saying that you cannot have rules of
convenience-ones that have so little coherence at their core that
they can be manipulated to reach any result.
Perhaps it is not surprising to see a court of specialization relying
on minute distinctions of questionable value, particularly a court with
science as its domain. In many circumstances, courts have manifested
the irresistible urge to deflect difficult decisions by cloaking
themselves in a veil of scientific distinctions, regardless of whether
those distinctions speak to the legal issue at hand. With a court of
specialization, buffered by its own dialect and isolated from the more
human body is irrelevant and the transformation of human blood could become
unnecessary with hypothetical scientific advances).
70. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also supra text accompanying
notes 44-45 (describing the way in which Prometheus is inconsistent with the Grams
precedent).
71. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 23 (describing the Federal Circuit's approach in
patentable subject matter as characteristic of bright-line rules, with the Supreme Court's
approach expressing a preference for flexible standards).
72 See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (Oxford 2009) (chronicling
this history).
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frequent channels of review that provide discipline for other courts,
such difficulties may be structurally predictable.73 As I have noted in
the past, this type of court can easily lose itself in the technical aspects
of a case, providing camouflage for the failure to resolve issues or to
resolve them in a rational manner. Most important, the parties tend
to shroud themselves in jargon, which can obscure the relevant issues
for the court itself and for the Supreme Court justices who might
consider wading into the issues. Regardless of these temptations, the
Supreme Court appears to be reminding the Federal Circuit that logic
and coherence should prevail.
Of course, wisdom can be easier to expound than to live by.
When the Supreme Court tries to demonstrate the outlines of a test
for patentable subject matter, the Court runs into its own problems in
trying to construct a framework of general applicability that displays
logical consistency. In an effort to draw together the precedents in
patentable subject matter to form the basis of a coherent approach,
the Court stumbled when it insisted on preserving both the Flook and
the Diehr opinions, trying to articulate a principled distinction
between the two.
As described above, the two cases really are quite difficult to
distinguish. First we have Diehr:
a process for updating the moment that rubber-curing should
end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to
constantly recalculate the relevant moment, based on a series of
changing factors.
With remarkable similarity, we have Flook:
a process for updating the moment that catalytic conversion
should end, using a computerized formula and a set of steps to
constantly recalculate the relevant moment, based on a series of
changing factors.
Expressed in this manner, the two are strikingly similar, and it is
diffichlt to understand why the Supreme Court would reject one and
uphold the other. And for that matter, if the process of constantly
calculating the curing of rubber and determining when to open the
mold is patentable, why can't we think of the invention in Prometheus
73. See id. at 193 (describing problems at the Federal Circuit as structurally
predictable, as explained in the remainder of the paragraph above).
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as the process of determining the moment that the patient has been
properly cooked?
I believe the Supreme Court in Prometheus was trying to say
something like the following: "The rubber process inventor put
together a series of steps. These steps were not standard practice
before, because it was not possible to perform them without the
advent of computers. Just adding a computer program element in
and of itself, however, does not create a patentable subject matter
problem. The issue turns on what the inventor is trying to claim. Is
the inventor trying to claim a specific process or is the inventor trying
to claim the computer program, or this type of computer program, in
general?"
The distinction above is a difficult one to maintain, however,
given the similarity of the facts in Flook and Diehr. Moreover, if the
Supreme Court wanted to make the point that one should not get lost
in the niceties of framing and draftsmanship, Flook and Diehr were
an unfortunate choice for manifesting the proper doctrinal approach.
One could easily argue that the different result in the two cases rested
on better lawyering rather than any difference in the character of the
inventions.74
Moreover, the Supreme Court's criticism of the Federal Circuit,
for failing to faithfully follow the language of the Patent Act, rings
somewhat hollow. Recall that the Justices chided the Federal Circuit
for finding machine and transformation limitations hidden in the folds
of the Patent Act's language defining the term "process" to mean
"process, art or method."75 By the same token, one would have to ask
how the Supreme Court's own limitations on patentable subject
matter have arisen from Patent Act language. As one scholar has
commented, one could argue that the Court's limitations on
patentable subject matter, such as those prohibiting the patenting of
laws of nature or mathematical formulas, seem to have simply
emerged from the primordial ooze of the 19th century.76
Nevertheless, in its patentable subject matter communications to
the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has quite clearly conveyed a
series of messages, as well as indicated its intent to continue the
conversation. Now that the Supreme Court has remanded the Myriad
74. FELDMAN, supra note 10.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
76. This wonderfully colorful comment was made by Peter Mcneil at the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology Conference on Patentable Subject Matter in the Health
Sciences in April 2012.
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case on gene patenting, with instructions that the Federal Circuit
reconsider its decision in light of Prometheus," one can anticipate the
likelihood of further conversation through this medium.
Software manufacturers who have watched Bilski and
Prometheus with trepidation and who face calls for the elimination of
patents on software will be parsing every word of the opinions for
clues to the future. As a software manufacturer, one could nurture
hope in the fact that in reaffirming Diehr, the Court implicitly
suggested that not all computer-related inventions should be treated
as natural laws or abstract ideas and that some will pass muster.
Nevertheless, looking at the Court's distain in Prometheus for
"conventional steps specified at a high level of generality," I would be
very worried if I were a software maker. The phrase "conventional
steps specified at a high level of generality" could describe many
software patents that have been issued by the PTO across time. As
noted above, I would predict that Ass'n for Molecular Pathology and
one yet-to-be-determined case on software patents are likely to form
the third and fourth legs of the court's table in this realm.
M11. Finding the Solution
In anticipation of the further conversation ahead, this section
suggests a doctrinal approach to provide logical coherence
throughout patentable subject matter. The approach also has the
potential for harmonizing, to the greatest extent possible, the
Supreme Court's past precedents.
Much of this essay has focused on process patents-that is,
patents on a process of doing something. Patent courts and
commentators generally divide inventions into two separate types: (1)
patents on processes and (2) patents on products. I would argue,
however, that everything in the world of innovation does not fall so
neatly into those two categories.
Consider genes, for example. Patents on gene sequences are
treated as product patents, and genetic material in a laboratory petri
dish is certainly as tangible as any drop of chemical in that dish would
be. Nevertheless, genes are a strange type of product. Human genes
are literally a sequence of nucleotides that operate as a set of
77. To add to its confusing history, the case has been renamed, once again, and is now
styled as Ass'n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. See Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (March 26, 2012) (vacating
and remanding to the Federal Circuit in light of the Court's decision in Mayo
Collaborative Services et al v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.).
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instructions for carrying out some function in the human body.78
Normally, a set of instructions is considered a process, rather than a
product, but once again, genes are as tangible as any product one
might create.
It takes a certain amount of mental gymnastics to contemplate a
thing whose nature combines both product and process. If one could
create an instruction manual that operated on its own, for example,
would it be a process or a product? One could argue that software, to
some extent, is an example of another hybrid of this kind. Software
itself could be thought of as a set of instructions. It is a set of
instructions, however, that is designed to operate itself, to produce a
set of results.
It is possible that within this strange world of hybrids, at the
intersection of biology and software, one could find a solution to
patentable subject matter. Personalized medicine actually falls at this
intersection, and inventions in the field may offer a road map for a
solution. Although the Supreme Court did not find patentability in
the personalized medicine invention in Prometheus, more
sophisticated personalized medicine inventions may pass muster. In
addition, the marriage of biology and software is the perfect
opportunity to highlight where the law has gone off course in
patentable subject matter and how to fix the problem.
A key aspect of the problem unfolded as computer and software
inventors in the 1980s tried to figure out how to craft claims that the
Supreme Court would be willing.to accept. One thing was clear from
the Court's decision: the claims had to avoid looking anything like
mathematics or they would risk being labeled algorithms. As a result,
patent practitioners began drafting patents claims by describing what
the computer or software was doing in simple English terms. The
approach had the incidental effect of covering many different ways of
accomplishing the same result, giving the patent holder control of a
tremendously broad swath of territory.
The patent system continues to strain under this legacy.
Consider, for example, a recent patent on a user interface. Following
78. For a more complete discussion of genes in this manner, an in-depth discussion of
possible solutions in the Association for Molecular Pathology case, and additional
discussion of the personalized medicine concepts raised here, see Robin Feldman, Whose
Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects of Property and Intellectual
Property Law, 63 STANFORD L. REV. 1377 (2011).
79. 1 have described this history and its effects in additional detail in FELDMAN, supra
note 10, at 108-13.
[Vol. 5:1
Winter 2013] A CONVERSATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 29
is the actual claims language from the patent. The patent claims a
monitor, a memory, and a transmitter and a processor configured to:
Monitor a product for a predefined trigger event, increment a
counter, cause the display of a user interface, and if the counter
exceeds a threshold, cause the memory to store an input received
from the interface and cause the transmitted to transmit the input to a
server.
80
This language in this patent is incredibly broad. The point is that
using simple prose to describe what a computer is accomplishing has
the effect of granting a huge swath of territory to the inventor, with
the potential to reach well beyond what the inventor actually has
accomplished up to that point. Such is the legacy of our aversion to
math.
One effective pathway for limiting the reach of patents in
software or bioinformatics has been blocked by Supreme Court
language expressing disapproval of so-called "field of use"
restrictions. Rejection of field of use restrictions flows from the
notion that if a patent claims a law of nature, one cannot save the
patent by limiting use of that law of nature to a particular field. For
example, a patent claiming the law of gravity cannot be saved by
limiting use of the law of gravity to the field of building bridges.8'
Nevertheless, all inventions, to some extent, involve specific
applications of natural laws. It would be difficult to imagine any
mechanical invention, for example, that did not apply the law of
gravity in some aspect.
The key is distinguishing between two types of patents. On the
one side are those patents in which the field of use restriction does no
more than mask preemption of the natural law in a specific area. On
the other side are those patents that represent an application of that
natural law in a particular commercial endeavor.
The Supreme Court's general rejection of field of use restriction
continues to echo throughout modern Supreme Court language. For
example, the Court in Prometheus quoted its own language from
Bilski, quoting its own language from Flook, that "limiting an abstract
idea to one field of use ... did not make the concept patentable." U In
crafting this quote, the Court indicates a long legacy against field of
use restrictions. I would suggest that this legacy-long standing as it
80. See U.S. Patent No. 7620565.
81. See Feldman, supra note 78, at 1400-01 (using the bridge building example).
82. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. ., 132 S. Ct.
1289,1301 (2012).
30 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
is-rests on fundamental misconceptions about what an algorithm is,
how a computer program operates, and the avenues available for
limiting the reach of computer claims.
In computer science, an algorithm is defined as a series of steps
performed on input data by a computer.8 A series of steps performed
on input data by a computer will raise preemption concerns in some
circumstances and not in others. One must know much more about a
computer program-beyond the term "algorithm"-to determine
whether granting a patent on the program would result in preemption
problems. For example, some computer algorithms are based on
properties of particular types of data. This sort of algorithm, one that
can be used on a variety of types of data, threatens to create
preemption problems. If we are asked to grant a patent on a software
program that works with entire sets of numbers or types of data, we
should have concerns about the breadth of inventions that would be
blocked out as a result. In contrast, a computer algorithm applied to
a specific type of input data in an effort to reach specific types of
output data would not raise the same preemption concerns.
As long as the patent system's approach to software revolves
around broad, prose language descriptions of what the software does,
field of use restrictions will remain the most effective way to ensure
that inventors are limiting their patents to a particular application of
natural laws. At its core, this is the distinction that the Supreme
Court is struggling to make out of Flook and Diehr. The Court's
decisions in these two cases can be characterized as focusing on
whether the inventor was trying to claim a type of computer program
in general, rather than a specific application and a specific way to
apply the type of program.
In perfect candor, a completely satisfying resolution of Flook and
Diehr would benefit from an acknowledgment that while the
expressions of the claims and the discussion of their preemption risks
diverged, the facts of the two cases were quite similar. Sections of
Flook are simply incompatible with the decision in Diehr, and one
could argue that the court would be better served by retreating from
its first, and perhaps imperfect, foray into computer-related
inventions in Flook.
In my view, the proper test for determining patentable subject
matter should focus both on preemption and on the tests for
83. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 132-34 (describing algorithms and expanding on
the concepts briefly discussed here concerning how different types of algorithms raise
differing levels of preemption concerns).
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patentability as a whole. I would express the basic inquiry in the
following manner: Considering the limitations of the patent system as
a whole, are we likely to have preemption problems with the subject
matter of this patent?8
Just as the test above would yield different results for different
types of computer algorithms, so should it yield different results for
different types of personalized medicine inventions. Personalized
medicine inventions vary greatly in their composition and
sophistication. LabCorp could be characterized as a relatively simple
one, in which a single biomarker is measured and correlated with a
disease state.
These inventions, however, can be vastly more complex. Some
use hundreds of biomarkers combined with complex machine-
learning algorithms to search out and identify patterns or groups of
markers that may, to some measurable degree, indicate the benefit of
a particular treatment or approach. The inventive models that result
are probabilistic and interpretative. They do not reflect any
individual's natural state, let alone the state of nature as a whole.
They are not merely a reflection of nature; they are an interpretive
model of nature.
Properly drawn, claims to the type of complex, personalized
medicine invention described here would leave plenty of room for the
development of competing models of nature, even competing models
relating to that particular disease state. Thus, they should not raise
the same types of preemption concerns.
As described above, a computer algorithm applied to a specific
type of input data in an effort to reach specific types of output data
should not raise preemption concerns. Similarly, a bioinformatics
statistical model using a fixed set of markers to produce a specific
diagnosis would not threaten to preempt the same diagnosis using
different markers or different statistical models. Although neither
LabCorp nor Prometheus could satisfy the Court's vision of a
sufficient addition to what nature or laws of nature have to offer,
perhaps the interpretive models of highly sophisticated personalized
medicine inventions could.
In short, the Supreme Court is already deep into its conversation
with the Federal Circuit, and it has so much more to say. Analyzing
the issues as described above could help the Supreme Court's various
forays into the world of computer-related inventions as well as create
84. See Feldman, supra note 78, at 1391-95.
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a doctrinal structure applicable across all areas of patentable subject
matter with logical consistency.
